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STILL OUT OF STEP: THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION OF A “BUT-FOR” 
STANDARD FOR ADA PLAINTIFFS IN 
LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT ACQUISITION CORP. 
ALLISON J. ZIMMON* 
Abstract: On May 25, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, reversed seventeen years of precedent and joined its sister circuits 
by discarding the “sole cause” standard for proving discrimination under Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). By declining to adopt the “moti-
vating factor” standard used in the majority of the other circuits, and instead 
adopting a “but-for” standard, the Sixth Circuit’s ADA jurisprudence continues to 
be an outlier. This Comment argues that the “but-for” standard imposes an unfair 
burden on vulnerable and disabled employees who are seeking relief from em-
ployers’ discriminatory treatment, and therefore fails to effectuate the congres-
sional intent behind the ADA. 
INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, reversed seventeen years of precedent and joined its sister circuits by 
setting aside the “sole cause” standard for proving discrimination under Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 Until its decision in Lewis v. 
Humboldt Acquisition Corp., the Sixth Circuit required an ADA plaintiff to 
prove that her disability was the “sole cause” of an employer’s adverse action 
against her.2 By holding ADA plaintiffs to this standard, the Sixth Circuit was 
out of step with other circuits, none of which apply a “sole cause” standard.3 
The majority of circuits instead apply a “motivating factor” standard under 
which a plaintiff need only prove that his or her disability was one of several 
potential factors that contributed to his or her employer’s adverse employment 
action.4 
The imposition of a “sole cause” standard in ADA discrimination claims 
required plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit to meet a much higher burden of proof 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE 2013–2014. 
 1 See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (Lewis II), 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc); see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 2 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 3 See id. at 315. 
 4 See id. at 324–25 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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than what was required of plaintiffs in other circuits.5 The Sixth Circuit took 
steps to level the playing field for ADA claimants in its jurisdiction by elimi-
nating the “sole cause” requirement in Lewis and adopting a “but-for” stand-
ard.6 By adopting a “but-for” standard, however, plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit 
will still have a high bar to meet in order to make a successful ADA discrimi-
nation claim.7 Adoption of this standard runs counter to the purpose of anti-
discrimination laws like the ADA and introduces a disparity in the remedies 
available to plaintiffs who pursue claims under the ADA, as opposed to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act.8 
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and procedural his-
tory of Lewis’s claim. Part II explores the history of ADA jurisprudence in the 
Sixth Circuit and traces the reasoning that led to the Sixth Circuit’s abandon-
ment of the “sole cause” standard. Part II also discusses the court’s decision 
not to adopt the “motivating factor” standard and the contrary conclusions ad-
vocated in the concurring opinions. Part III argues that although the court was 
correct to abandon the “sole cause” standard, its decision to adopt a “but-for” 
standard imposes an unfair burden on vulnerable, disabled employees who 
seek relief from employers’ discriminatory treatment. 
I. SUSAN LEWIS’S TERMINATION AND THE “SOLE CAUSE” STANDARD  
IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
In July of 2004, Susan Lewis, a registered nurse, began working at Hum-
boldt Manor Nursing Home as a supervisor.9 Just a few months later, in Sep-
tember, Lewis developed a medical condition that impacted her lower extremi-
ties and made it difficult for her to walk.10 In October, after a one-month medi-
cal leave of absence, Lewis sought and received permission from the facility 
administrator to return to work and use a wheelchair as needed.11 Lewis al-
leged that after she returned to work, her supervisors and co-workers began to 
treat her negatively.12 On March 15, 2006 Lewis became ill and had to lie 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. at 325. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2m (2006); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 331 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 9 See Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant Susan Lewis at 6, Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition 
Corp. (Lewis I), 634 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-6381), rev’d en banc, 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 
2012) [hereinafter Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant]. 
 10 Id. at 6; see Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (Lewis II), 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc). 
 11 Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 6; see Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 12 Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 6; Brief of the Defendant-Appellee 
Humboldt Acquisition Corp. at 10, Lewis I, 634 F.3d 879 (No. 09-6381) (contending that Lewis did 
not present any convincing evidence to support her claim and that she never complained to the admin-
istrator of Humboldt Manor about any negative treatment from her co-workers.) 
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down on the floor of a resident’s room.13 A co-worker confronted her and Lew-
is became very upset.14 This confrontation resulted in what Humboldt Manor 
termed an “outburst” at the nurses’ station by Lewis that involved the use of 
profanity, yelling, and criticism of her supervisors.15 Although Lewis acknowl-
edged that she was upset, she denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior.16 
Nevertheless, Humboldt Manor terminated Lewis on March 20, 2006, citing 
the incident at the nurses’ station as the reason.17 Lewis contended that her 
employers’ reason was mere pretext and that she was actually fired because of 
her disability.18 As a result, on March 16, 2007, she filed suit in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Tennessee for wrongful termination un-
der the ADA.19 
After the first jury to hear the case in March of 2009 was unable to reach 
a verdict, the case was reheard in November of that year.20 At the charge con-
ference, the two sides argued for competing versions of jury instructions.21 
Lewis requested that the jury be instructed that she had to prove that her disa-
bility was either a “motivating factor” or a “substantial factor” and not the 
“sole cause” of her termination.22 Humboldt Manor requested that the jury be 
given instructions consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent, namely that Lewis 
must prove that her disability was the “sole cause” for her termination.23 The 
district court used Humboldt Manor’s requested instructions, following Sixth 
Circuit precedent, and instructed the jury that they could only find an ADA 
violation if they first found that Lewis’s disability was the “sole cause” of her 
termination.24 
During deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the judge re-
garding this instruction, indicating that they were struggling with the “sole 
cause” requirement.25 The trial judge instructed the jury to obey the instruc-
tions as written.26 On November 16, 2009, the jury came back with a judgment 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
 14 See id. at 7. 
 15 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 16 See Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 7. 
 17 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. at 313; Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 4. 
 20 See Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 21 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 313–14; Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 22 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 313–14; Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 23 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 313–14. 
 24 See id. at 314. 
 25 Petition for Rehearing En Banc on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Lewis at 2, Lewis I, 634 
F.3d 879 (No. 09-6381) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing En Banc]. The jury asked the following 
questions: “Do we have to find under section 3 . . . that the reason for Ms. Lewis’s termination was 
. . . solely because of her disability? What if we believe it may only have been a contributing factor? 
Do we still answer ‘no?’” Id. (quoting Transcript of Trial at 96, Lewis I, 634 F.3d 879 (No. 09-6381)). 
 26 Id. 
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that Lewis was disabled and met the qualifications for coverage by the ADA.27 
Nevertheless, the jury found that Lewis’s disability was not the sole cause of 
her termination.28 Therefore, as defined by the jury instruction, Humboldt 
Manor did not illegally discriminate against Lewis when they terminated her 
employment.29 The district court accordingly entered a judgment in favor of 
Humboldt Manor.30 
On November 18, 2009, Lewis appealed the district court’s decision to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.31 Lewis asserted that the dis-
trict court committed a reversible error when it instructed the jury to use the 
“sole cause” standard.32 On March 17, 2011, a panel of the Sixth Circuit found 
that the jury instructions were consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s precedent and 
affirmed the district court’s ruling.33 Although he concurred with the decision, 
Judge Richard Allen Griffin delivered a separate opinion in which he stated 
directly that the Sixth Circuit’s ADA precedent was wrong and that he believed 
that the matter should be heard en banc.34 
Lewis heeded Judge Griffin’s call and petitioned for a rehearing en banc 
in April of 2011.35 The Sixth Circuit granted her request and all sixteen judges 
heard the case in November.36 On May 25, 2012, Judge Jeffrey Sutton issued 
the en banc majority’s decision with nine judges joining and seven remaining 
judges issuing three separate opinions that concurred in part and dissented in 
part.37 The judges unanimously found that the Sixth Circuit’s use of the “sole 
cause” standard was incorrect and “out of sync” with the other circuits because 
it was based on an erroneous application of the causation standard contained in 
the Rehabilitation Act.38 Despite recognizing that its “sole cause” standard was 
incorrect, the court declined to adopt the “motivating factor” standard used by 
the majority of the circuits.39 Instead it adopted a “but-for” standard in line 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Gross v. FBL Financial Services.40 Be-
cause the district court relied upon precedent that was now overruled, the en 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Lewis I, 634 F.3d at 880. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314; Lewis I, 634 F.3d at 880. 
 30 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314; Lewis I, 634 F.3d at 880. 
 31 Position Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 9, at 4. 
 32 See Lewis I, 634 F.3d at 880. 
 33 See id. at 879 (holding that the court was constrained by a prior decision mandating that plain-
tiffs who allege violations of the ADA must meet a sole cause standard of proof in the Sixth Circuit). 
 34 See id. at 882 (Griffin, J., concurring). 
 35 See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 25, at 17. 
 36 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 312–13. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. at 314–15. 
 39 Id. at 317. 
 40 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 321. 
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banc court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for a 
new trial.41 
II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO ADA JURISPRUDENCE 
All sixteen Sixth Circuit judges agreed that the court should no longer re-
quire ADA plaintiffs to meet the “sole cause” standard of proof.42 The judges 
were divided, however, in their conclusions about which standard should be 
applied in the “sole cause” standard’s stead.43 The majority favored a “but-for” 
standard, while the seven concurring judges advocated that the court adopt a 
“motivating factor” standard instead.44 
A. Unanimous Decision to Abandon the “Sole Cause” Standard 
The en banc court reached the unanimous conclusion that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s use of the “sole cause” standard in its ADA jurisprudence was incorrect 
and needed to be abandoned.45 The majority opinion began its discussion of 
the origin of the Sixth Circuit’s error with an analysis of the text of three rele-
vant statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
and the ADA.46 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1964.47 As en-
acted, Title VII made it unlawful “for an employer . . . to discriminate against 
any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”48 In 1991, Congress revised Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. The parties settled the case in December 2012. See Order Adminis-
tratively Closing Case, Lewis II, 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 1:07CV1054 JDB egb). 
 42 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (Lewis II), 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc); 
id. at 322, 325 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 331 (Stranch, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); id. (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 43 See id. at 321 (majority opinion); id. at 324 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 341 (Donald, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 44 See id. at 321 (majority opinion); id. at 324 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 341 (Donald, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 45 Id. at 315 (majority opinion). 
 46 Id. at 314–15. 
 47 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2m) (2006); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 317. 
 48 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 78 Stat. at 253–57. This Act stated that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
92 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:E. Supp. 
to address mixed-motive discrimination cases.49 The new language in Title VII 
established that an employment practice is unlawful if the plaintiff can show 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a “motivating factor” be-
hind the employer’s adverse action, even if the employer also had other rea-
sons for that action.50 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against people 
with disabilities if the plaintiff can show that his or her disability was the sole 
cause of the discrimination.51 Because the Rehabilitation Act only applied to 
entities that received federal funds, Congress passed the ADA in 1990 to cover 
entities that were not federally funded.52 When Lewis filed her lawsuit in 2007, 
Title I of the ADA provided that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual.”53 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 amended Title I by replacing the 
“because of” language with “on the basis of.”54 Even as amended, the ADA 
does not contain the “sole cause” language found in the Rehabilitation Act.55 
Notwithstanding the textual differences between the three statutes, the 
Sixth Circuit imported the “sole cause” causation standard from the Rehabilita-
tion Act into its ADA jurisprudence.56 Beginning with Maddox v. University of 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2m (2006) (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”); see Lewis II, 681 F.3d 
at 317. 
 50 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2m; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 317. 
 51 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 315. The Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 reads: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in 
section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Ser-
vice. 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 52 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 53 See Americans with Disabilities Act, § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331–32 (“No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual 
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); Lewis II, 
681 F.3d at 315. 
 54 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3557 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 315. 
 55 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual 
on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge 
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 315. 
 56 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
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Tennessee, a 1995 case involving claims under both the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act, the court began to require ADA plaintiffs to prove that their disabil-
ity was the sole cause of the employer’s adverse employment action against 
them.57 In 1996, the court imposed the “sole cause” standard in Monette v. 
Electronic Systems Corp., a case that involved only an ADA claim.58 Since 
1996, the Sixth Circuit has required ADA plaintiffs to meet the “sole cause” 
standard to prevail.59 The Lewis majority opinion posited that because Maddox 
involved both ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court “blurred the dis-
tinction between the laws.”60 Additionally, the common goals of both the Re-
habilitation Act and the ADA most likely contributed to the court’s erroneous 
choice.61 By the time Lewis filed her lawsuit in 2007, no other circuits im-
posed a “sole cause” standard onto ADA claimants.62 
In addition to recognizing that the text of the ADA did not support the use 
of a “sole cause” standard, the court also relied upon a recent Supreme Court 
decision to bolster its decision to change course after seventeen years.63 Gross 
v. FBL Financial Services, decided in 2009, concerned a claim made under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).64 In Gross, a fifty-
four year old employee alleged that he was demoted by his employer and re-
placed with a younger employee because of his age.65 As with the court in 
Lewis, the Supreme Court in Gross was asked to decide whether the causation 
standard from one statute could be imported into or applied to another stat-
ute.66 Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the ADEA’s “because 
of” language meant that a “but-for” standard was required, or whether Title 
VII’s “motivating factor” language could apply instead.67 
In Gross, the Court refused to apply Title VII’s language to the ADEA and 
instead required the plaintiff to meet a “but-for” standard.68 The Court held 
that it was improper to apply the causation standards from one discrimination 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id.; Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 58 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314; Monette v. Elec. Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 59 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314; see also Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 
357, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 60 Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. at 315 (citing cases to support the proposition that no other circuits import the “sole cause” 
standard into the ADA). 
 63 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 314. Compare 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate . . . on the basis of 
disability . . . .”), with Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be . . . subjected to discrimination.”). 
 64 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); 
Gross, 557 U.S. at 170; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 318. 
 65 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 170. 
 66 See id. at 174–78; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 318. 
 67 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 318. 
 68 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174, 176; Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 318. 
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statute to another, especially without closely examining the text of the statutes 
for clear language indicating the standards to be met.69 The Lewis court rea-
soned that the Gross decision required it to likewise refrain from importing a 
causation standard from one statute to another.70 The Lewis court decided that 
its long-standing application of the “sole cause” standard to ADA plaintiffs 
was an incorrect importation of the causation standard from the Rehabilitation 
Act and must be abandoned.71 
B. Disagreement on the Standard to Apply 
After determining that the “sole cause” standard used for the last seven-
teen years needed to be jettisoned, the Sixth Circuit turned to the question of 
which standard of causation should replace it.72 The Sixth Circuit majority re-
lied on Gross once again for guidance.73 The Supreme Court in Gross was not 
convinced that legislative history indicating common statutory goals was suffi-
cient to overcome the textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII to 
apply the same standard to both laws.74 Despite arguments from both parties in 
Lewis that the textual cross-references between the ADA and Title VII and the 
legislative history of the two statutes pointed to either a “sole cause” or a “mo-
tivating factor” standard, the court declined to impose either standard.75 Be-
cause the Supreme Court in Gross was not swayed by similar arguments, the 
Lewis majority was also not moved.76 Instead, the Lewis majority held that the 
“because of” language in the ADA, like the “because of” language in the 
ADEA, meant that an employee must prove that his or her disability was a 
“but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action.77 
The entire en banc court did not embrace the majority’s adoption of a 
“but-for” standard.78 Judges Eric L. Clay, Jane B. Stranch, and Bernice B. 
Donald all wrote decisions concurring with the court’s abandonment of the 
“sole cause” standard and dissenting with the court’s imposition of a “but-for” 
standard.79 Rejecting the majority’s use of Gross to justify its refusal to adopt 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Lewis II, 681 F.3d at 316 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 174). 
 70 See id. at 318–19. 
 71 See id. at 317. 
 72 See id. at 321. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 320. 
 75 See id. at 319. 
 76 See id. at 320. 
 77 See id. at 321. 
 78 See id. at 325 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 325–26 (Stranch, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 341–42 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 79 See id. at 322, 325 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 325–26 (Stranch, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 331, 341 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
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the “motivating factor” standard, Judges Clay, Stranch, and Donald looked in-
stead to congressional intent, legislative history, and the rules of statutory con-
struction to guide their conclusion that the “motivating factor” standard should 
apply to ADA claims.80 
All three judges disagreed with the majority’s treatment of the relation-
ship between Title VII and the ADA.81 Judge Clay wrote that it is essential to 
look at a civil rights statute in relation to other civil rights statutes in order to 
determine both the meaning of the text and the congressional intent behind its 
enactment.82 Because the ADA was enacted to expand the protection of Title 
VII, and the ADA explicitly cross-references Title VII in its text, Judge Clay 
noted that Congress meant for the two statutes to be treated as companions.83 
The U.S. House of Representatives Report on the ADA explained that any 
amendments made to Title VII would apply to the ADA.84 Judge Clay there-
fore reasoned that the ADA’s use of “because of” should be defined by Title 
VII’s “motivating factor” language.85 According to Judge Clay, the majority’s 
reliance on Gross and dismissal of the relationship between the ADA and Title 
VII was the wrong approach.86 
In addition, Judge Clay considered the purpose of an en banc hearing 
when reaching his opinion.87 Judge Clay observed that by leaving the Sixth 
Circuit in opposition to the other circuits, the majority did not accomplish the 
goal of an en banc hearing, which was to bring the Sixth Circuit in line with 
the predominant approach in the other circuits.88 Judge Clay pointed out that 
the majority of the circuits use the “motivating factor” standard.89 In addition, 
Judge Clay noted that the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of a “but-for” standard im-
poses a different, higher burden on plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit than on plain-
tiffs in other circuits.90 
Like Judge Clay, Judge Stranch determined that adopting the “but-for” 
standard was incorrect.91 According to Judge Stranch, congressional intent, 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See id. at 322, 324–25 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 325–27 
(Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 332, 340 (Donald, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 81 See id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 327, 329 (Stranch, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 331–32 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 82 See id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
327). 
 85 See id. at 322–23. 
 86 See id. at 324. 
 87 See id. at 322. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 324–25. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. at 325–26 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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legislative history, and the rules of statutory construction pointed to the con-
clusion that the majority incorrectly interpreted the relationship between the 
ADA and Title VII.92 Although the majority relied on Gross to draw a dividing 
line between statutes, the rules of statutory construction mandate that the two 
statutes be looked at in concert.93 According to Judge Stranch, Congress in-
tended to establish the same powers, remedies, and procedures in the ADA and 
that existed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.94 Because the ADA was passed 
in 1990, a year before the Civil Rights Act was amended by Congress in 1991, 
Congress made sure the two statutes would be linked by incorporating Title 
VII provisions into the ADA by reference.95 Judge Stranch believed that Con-
gress, by linking Title VII and the ADA, intended that the two statutes would 
evolve jointly going forward.96 
In addition, Judge Stranch noted that the rules of statutory construction 
compel courts to assume that Congress was aware of current law when enact-
ing legislation.97 The current law at the time Congress passed the ADA in 1990 
and amended Title VII in 1991 was the “motivating factor” standard, as held 
by the Supreme Court in 1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.98 Therefore, 
Judge Stranch reasoned, Congress meant to impose a “motivating factor” 
standard onto the ADA.99 
The concurring judges observed that the burden a “but-for” standard plac-
es on employees in the Sixth Circuit violated the congressional intent behind 
the ADA.100 Judge Clay noted that under a “but-for” standard, the employee 
must prove that even if other reasons were present and could have caused the 
employer to take an adverse action against the employee, it was the employee’s 
disability that caused the employer to act.101 This standard requires the em-
ployee to have knowledge of the employer’s internal decision-making process 
and determine how much weight the employer placed on a variety of factors.102 
In contrast, under a “motivating factor” standard, an employee would on-
ly have to prove that his or her disability was one factor that the employer con-
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sidered when imposing the adverse consequence.103 With a “but-for” standard, 
an employer could rather easily rebut the employee’s allegations by offering 
other performance related reasons for the adverse action.104 With a “motivating 
factor” standard, the employer cannot avoid liability simply by pointing to oth-
er factors; the employee is only required to prove that his or her disability was 
one of the factors resulting in the employer’s action, not that other factors were 
not present.105 Judge Clay reasoned that imposing a “but-for” standard errone-
ously and unfairly places a burden on employees in the Sixth Circuit that is 
“greater than the burden intended by Congress.”106 
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REMAINS AN OUTLIER 
When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, it noted the persistence of dis-
crimination against Americans with disabilities in many areas of life, including 
employment.107 According to Congress, the ADA was intended to provide le-
gal recourse for the disabled who, unlike people who were discriminated 
against on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, had no 
legal avenue to pursue redress.108 Congress further noted that the disabled 
should not be segregated from the rest of the population and prevented from 
competing in the working world.109 Discrimination, which can deny disabled 
individuals fair access to employment, was deemed by Congress to perpetuate 
a costly culture of dependency on the state and to run contrary to the American 
ideals of self-sufficiency and independence.110 
The Sixth Circuit, by declining to adopt the “motivating factor” standard 
advocated by the concurring judges, did not effectuate Congress’s goal of 
providing a consistent standard for the treatment of the disabled.111 Instead, the 
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Sixth Circuit remains out of step with the majority of the country and provides 
an uneven playing field for Sixth Circuit plaintiffs.112 As Judge Clay correctly 
noted, the majority decision took the Sixth Circuit “a step back” by placing a 
burden of proof on employees that was not intended by Congress.113 Congress 
purposefully linked the ADA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with the 
goal of helping disabled workers when it passed the ADA.114 Therefore, it re-
mains incongruous for the Sixth Circuit to interpret the law in such a way that 
hinders the very workers it was designed to help.115 
In addition to being required to meet a higher burden of proof than claim-
ants in other circuits, ADA claimants in the Sixth Circuit are also required to 
meet a higher burden of proof than Title VII claimants in their own circuit.116 
As Judges Clay and Stranch noted, Congress linked the ADA and Title VII, 
with the plan that the remedies available to plaintiffs would be the same under 
both laws.117 By requiring ADA plaintiffs to meet a “but-for” standard and Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs to meet a “motivating factor” standard, the plaintiffs in effect 
have different remedies available to them.118 The legislative history recounted 
by Judges Clay and Stranch indicates that Congress did not intend for an em-
ployee discriminated against on account of his or her race to have to meet a 
lower standard of proof than an employee discriminated against on account of 
his or her disability.119 
By relying on Gross to support its adoption of a “but-for” standard, the 
majority sidestepped the contextual analysis required to reach an accurate con-
clusion.120 In Gross the Supreme Court cautioned that a statute’s context must 
be considered when resolving disputes about its interpretation.121 Although the 
Court did such an analysis for the ADEA in the Gross case, the Lewis majority 
neglected to perform a similar analysis for the ADA.122 Instead, the Lewis ma-
jority applied the Gross Court’s conclusion about the ADEA to the ADA and 
concluded that the ADA, like the ADEA, required a “but-for” standard of 
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proof.123 Had the Lewis majority thoroughly examined the context in which the 
ADA was enacted, including its textual and legislative relationship to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act, it would have reached the 
correct conclusion that a “motivating factor” standard of proof should be re-
quired.124 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Sixth Circuit reached the appropriate conclusion in elimi-
nating the “sole cause” standard of proof from its ADA jurisprudence, the ma-
jority’s refusal to adopt a “motivating factor” standard, choosing instead to 
require a “but-for” standard, does little to move the Sixth Circuit into line with 
its sister circuits. Rather than level the playing field for disabled employees 
who face discrimination from employers, disabled employees who seek to sue 
their employers for discrimination under the ADA in the Sixth Circuit are still 
required to meet a very high standard of proof. Employers may continue to 
skirt discrimination laws with near impunity by claiming that they acted for 
reasons other than the employee’s protected characteristic. Disabled employees 
in the Sixth Circuit will in effect continue to receive a weaker level of protec-
tion from discrimination than their counterparts in the rest of the country. The 
Sixth Circuit’s approach runs counter to the purpose of anti-discrimination 
statutes like the ADA, Title VII, and the Rehabilitation Act, which seek to pro-
tect employees from unfair discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, and disability. With its decision in Lewis, the Sixth Circuit has 
turned laws designed to help disabled employees into additional hurdles those 
employees must clear in their quest for justice. 
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